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Abstract
The daily amount of Android malicious applications (apps) target-
ing the app repositories is increasing, and their number is overwhelm-
ing the process of fingerprinting. To address this issue, we propose
an enhanced Cypider framework, a set of techniques and tools aim-
ing to perform a systematic detection of mobile malware by building
a scalable and obfuscation resilient similarity network infrastructure
of malicious apps. Our approach is based on our proposed concept,
namely malicious community, in which we consider malicious instances
that share common features are the most likely part of the same mal-
ware family. Using this concept, we presumably assume that multiple
similar Android apps with different authors are most likely to be mali-
cious. Specifically, Cypider leverages this assumption for the detection
of variants of known malware families and zero-day malicious apps.
Cypider applies community detection algorithms on the similarity net-
work, which extracts sub-graphs considered as suspicious and possibly
malicious communities. Furthermore, we propose a novel fingerprint-
ing technique, namely community fingerprint, based on a one-class
machine learning model for each malicious community. Besides, we
proposed an enhanced Cypider framework, which requires less mem-
ory, ≈ x650%, and less time to build the similarity network, ≈ x700,
compared to the original version, without affecting the fingerprinting
performance of the framework. We introduce a systematic approach
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to locate the best threshold on different feature content vectors, which
simplifies the overall detection process. Cypider shows excellent results
by detecting 60% − 80% coverage of the malware dataset in one de-
tection iteration with higher precision 85%− 99% in the detected ma-
licious communities. On the other hand, the community fingerprints
are promising as we achieved 86%, 93%, and 94% in the detection of
the malware family, general malware, and benign apps respectively.
1 Introduction
Mobile devices and their applications have become an integrated part of our
everyday life. People nowadays are using mobile devices to store and send
their personal and sensitive data, which makes them attractive targets to
cyber criminals. Android [1] is the most popular and dominant operating
system among mobile users. In September 2019, Android had 76% of the
market share worldwide [2], as it is deployed on different devices such as
smartphones and tablets. It also succeeded in reaching other smart devices
such as TVs [3], watches [4], and cars [5]. Moreover, Android OS is increas-
ingly integrated into IoT systems, especially with the appearance of Google’s
Android Things [6], an embedded operating system that is designed for low-
power and resource-constrained IoT devices.
Android OS implements some mechanisms such as sandboxing, to provide
security for smart devices. However, the Android security mechanisms failed
to defend against the different threats. Due to its popularity, Android is
increasingly targeted by malware developers. According to G DATA [7],
there is an average of more than 10k new malware that appeared per day
in the first half of 2019, which corresponds to a new malicious app every 8
seconds.
Malware could be divided into two main classes: i) malware variant,
which is a new version of known malware, and ii) unseen malware or zero-day
malware, which is a new malicious app, which is unknown and not discovered
by security investigators and anti-malware vendors. Due to a large number of
released Android apps along with the daily emergence of malicious apps, the
manual investigation, and analysis of new apps have become a cumbersome
task. The conventional approaches rely on matching signature-based patterns
with known malware families. However, these approaches are not practical
and not effective, as they rely on cryptographic hashes. As a result, malware
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developers could easily evade detection by employing minor modifications
in the original malware app. Furthermore, signature-based approaches are
not capable of detecting new malware families, which raises serious concerns
about the systematic detection of new malware without or with minimum
human intervention. Other approaches are based heuristic-based or machine-
learning techniques to produce learning-based patterns, which aim to detect
known and new malware. They are more effective than the signature-based
ones at detecting zero-day malware. Still, their detection accuracy essentially
depends on the training set and the used features to generate the detection
model.
In this context, we aim at dealing with large-scale Android malware by
reducing the length of the analysis window of newly detected malware. This
time window ranges from malware detection to signature generation by secu-
rity vendors. When the analysis window is long, the malicious apps are given
more time to infect the users’ devices. The existing techniques incur a large
window due to the overwhelming number of Android apps that appear daily
. Besides, they employ a manual investigation to analyze malware. Thus,
there is a need to reduce reliance on manual analysis to reduce the length of
the analysis window. To achieve this objective, we propose systematic tools,
techniques, and approaches for the detection of both known and unseen mal-
ware (i.e., malware variants and zero-day malware). We assume that two
Android apps, each of which has a different author and certificate, are most
likely to be malicious if they are highly similar. This assumption relies on
the fact that the malware developer usually injects the same malicious pay-
load into multiple repackaged applications to hide it. Thus, it is unlikely to
find such a malicious payload in a benign Android app. Consequently, two
Android apps should not be highly similar with respect to their components,
except for known libraries. This observation could be used as a basis to
design and develop a security framework for Android malware detection.
In this paper, we are motivated by the earlier-mentioned to propose a
cyber-security framework, called Cypider (Cyber-Spider For Android Mal-
ware Detection), to identify and cluster Android malware without the need
of any prior knowledge about the signature-based or learning-based patterns
of Android malware apps. Cypider is a novel framework, which combines
techniques and methods to deal with the issue of Android malware cluster-
ing and fingerprinting. Cypider, and automatic framework that adopts an
unsupervised approach, is designed (1) to detect repackaged malware (or
malware families), which represent most of the Android malicious apps [8],
3
and (2) to detect new malware apps. The principal idea of Cypider is based
on building a similarity network that connects the input apps. After that,
sub-graphs with high connectivity, called communities, are extracted from
the similarity network. These communities are most likely composed of ma-
licious apps. This step is followed by generating a novel fingerprint for each
extracted community, called community fingerprinting. Instead of employ-
ing a hash or fuzzy hash-based signature of the app, the One-Class Support
Vector Machine learning model (OC-SVM) [9] is used to compute the com-
munity fingerprint of the Android malware family or sub-family. OC-SVM
is a machine learning technique, which is trained by using the features of one
class to generate the learning model, i.e., community fingerprint, to decide
whether a given unseen Android app belongs to the community or not. After
constructing the communities of malicious apps, Cypider framework triggers
a periodic process, which aims to build new communities from the remaining
apps (i.e., apps that do not belong to any community) and the new arrival
apps to Cypider, which together form what we call the active dataset.
The scalability issue of Cypider is addressed through three main tech-
niques: (1) the performance of Cypider is negatively impacted by the high
dimensionality of the statistical features that are extracted from the Apk
file. For this purpose, feature hashing [10] technique is employed to reduce
the high dimensional vector to a fixed-size vector without affecting the de-
tection rate. (2) Dimensionality reduction is applied to reduce to compress
the feature hashing vectors. (3) FAISS 1, which is a similarity computation
technique, is used to compute the similarity among the apps’ vectors, (4)
a scalable community detection algorithm [11] is used to extract the mali-
cious communities. To sum up, Cypider framework is a set of algorithms,
mechanisms, and techniques, which are integrated into one approach to de-
tect Android malicious app without requiring to any pre-knowledge about
the malware and their families. Besides, Cypider is designed to generate the
unsupervised fingerprints of the possible malware threats by leveraging the
proposed community fingerprint concept.
In the Original Cypider, we made the following contributions:
1. We designed and implemented an unsupervised-based Android malware
detection and family attribution framework. The proposed framework
has shown to be effective and efficient by applying a clustering ap-
proach, which leverages the community concept and graph partition
1https://github.com/facebookresearch/faiss
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techniques.
2. We proposed a community fingerprint, a novel detection model to rep-
resent the pattern of a given community, which could be an Android
malware family or subfamily.
In this paper, the main contributions of the enhanced Cypider are:
1. We propose an enhanced design for Cypider by applying dimensionality
reduction on feature hashing vectors to produce a short dense vector
for android malware (see Section 5). This enhancement increases the
efficiency of the similarity computation to ≈ x600 times (see Section
10.4) compared to the original design [12].
2. We propose a systematic mechanism to determine the best threshold
trade-off for the different contents of the APK file. This proposed
heuristic solves the issue of manual threshold search for each content
type as in the original design [12]. Furthermore, it provides the security
practitioner with a simple mechanism to customize Cypider between the
recall and precision settings (see Section 6).
3. We conduct detailed evaluations that assess the effect of our solution
hyper-parameters on the performance of the framework. We also assess
the scalability and the effectiveness of Cypider on large-scale datasets
namely: (1) Genome malware dataset [8], (2) Drebin malware dataset
[13, 14], (3) AndroZoo (66k) malware dataset, and (4) the combined
previous datasets with benign (50k) dataset. The evaluation experi-
ments show good results in the context of unsupervised malware detec-
tion (see Section 9, 10, and 11).
4. We conduct extensive experiments to measure the effect of different
obfuscation techniques on our framework using different obfuscated
datasets, PRAGuard [15] and Obfuscated Drebin (using DroidChameleon
[16]) and non-obfuscated datasets (MalGenome). Cypider shows high
resiliency against common obfuscation and code transformation tech-
niques (see Section 12).
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2 Overview
2.1 Threat Model
The main objective of Cypider is to detect Android malicious apps without the
need for any prior knowledge about these malware samples and their patterns.
More precisely, Cypider focuses mainly on the bulk detection of malware
families and malware variants rather than the detection of an individual
malicious app by extracting the malicious communities from the similarity
network of the apps dataset. The second objective of Cypider is to provide
a scalable yet accurate solution that can process the overwhelming number
of malware that appear daily, and which could compromise the users’ smart
devices. Cypider is robust (Section 12) but not immune against obfuscated
apps contents. Cypider could resist against some types of obfuscations as
it analyzes different static contents of the Android package. Cypider could
be more resilient to obfuscation as it could fingerprint malware apps with
other static contents that are not obfuscated, such as app permissions. It
is important to mention that static contents could be obfuscated in one app
and not in another, which is related mostly to how the malware developer
writes the malware code.
Cypider is evaluated under real malware datasets along with random An-
droid apps chosen from Google Play, where the apps are assumed to be ob-
fuscated through ProGuard, to test the effectiveness and efficiency of Cypider
in real word obfuscation scenarios. Cypider could not detect dynamic trans-
form attacks, e.g., when the malicious payload does not exist in APK static
file and is downloaded at runtime. The aim of Cypider is to detect homoge-
neous and pure malicious communities, where each community corresponds
to one malware family and hence makes the malware analysis process easier.
Besides, Cypider aims to provide a high detection accuracy along with a low
false-positive rate.
2.2 Usage Scenarios
Cypider is a generic approach that is used to investigate the existence of sim-
ilarity among apps and could be applied to various usage scenarios. The
first usage scenario is about the comparison of software programs, where the
input is a set of software programs, and the output is the set of programs
that have similar features. The possible application of this scenario is the
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authorship attribution, where the obtained communities represent the binary
programs that are written by the same author. The second scenario is about
detecting plagiarized software, a community of binary programs with differ-
ent authors, but similar to a given copyrighted software. The third and fourth
usage scenarios are malware detection and family attribution, respectively,
i.e., performing bulk detection by identifying communities of similar mali-
cious apps, and consequently infer their respective families. In this paper,
our focus is on Android malware detection.
Cypider is evaluated using two types of experimental scenarios. In the
first experiment, we only consider malicious Android apps. This experiment
aims to speed up the analysis process by performing bulk detection and
attribute the detected malware to their corresponding families. This is also
achieved by performing automatic analysis with minimal human intervention.
The family could be attributed to a community by starting with a small set
of apps, i.e., one app in most cases. On the other hand, unassigned apps
are considered suspicious and require manual investigation. The malware
analysis approaches could be divided into:
1. Semi-supervised Approach: We use a dataset of known malicious apps
and their families, in addition to unknown malicious apps. The dataset is
fed to Cypider to generate malicious communities. First, known malicious
apps from the same family are grouped (i.e., strongly-connected graph), and
assigned to the same community. Second, the unknown malicious apps, which
have similar features as an existing community, will most likely join that
community. Analogically, the communities of known malicious apps could
play the role of a magnet for unknown ones, if known and unknown apps
share the same features, which implies the same malware family.
2. Unsupervised Approach: We use a dataset that does not have any informa-
tion about the tested apps that are fed to Cypider. The aim is to find commu-
nities instead of a single malicious app. By focusing on finding communities
(i.e., bulk detection), security investigators could drastically increase their
productivity. In this paper, we consider the unsupervised approach.
In the second experimental scenario, we consider a mixed dataset of An-
droid apps (i.e., malicious and benign). Such a dataset could be the result
of a preliminary suspiciousness app filtering, which might lead to high false
positives. Let us suppose that benign apps (i.e., false positives) represent
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50%−75% of the size of suspicious apps; we could identify malicious apps by
detecting the communities that have a common payload, as we assume that
highly similar apps are likely to be malicious. In other words, malicious apps
from the same family tend to be very similar due to the shared malicious
payload. This assumption could be extended to benign apps. Benign apps
from the same category such as games tend to be similar due to the shared
features. The similarity between apps helps group malware into malicious
communities, but also helps group benign apps into benign communities. In
addition, Cypider could filter benign apps (i.e., less suspicious apps) that are
not similar to the suspicious apps in the active dataset. The previously de-
scribed approaches, i.e., Semi-supervised and Unsupervised, could be applied
to the mixed dataset to target Android malware detection and family attri-
bution. More specifically, we adopt the target of the unsupervised approach,
which detects malicious apps without any prior-knowledge about malware.
3 Methodology
Cypider framework is applied to a dataset of unlabeled apps (malicious or
mixed dataset), aiming to generate community fingerprints for the processed
apps. The overall architecture of Cypider is shown in Figure 1, and is com-
prised of the following steps:
In the first step, the apps that are developed by the same author, also
known as sibling apps, are filtered out. The main reason is to remove the
noise that could be produced by having sibling apps in the app communities,
as the authors tend to use the same components in their different apps.
Sibling apps could be identified through the information that is available in
the META-INF directory in the APK file, such as app version, app hash,
and author signature. Thus, only apps with different authors are kept as
adversaries prefer to use different fake author identities to evade detection in
case one of their apps is caught. To deal with many apps having the same
author, Cypider randomly chooses one app, and if it is found malicious after
analysis, all its sibling apps are considered malicious.
After filtering out the sibling apps, we extract meaningful information
(i.e., features) from the apps, to identify these apps and compute the simi-
larity among them. To this end, Cypider extracts statistical features from
all the apps. It is worth noting that the selected features must be resilient
against the attacker’s evasion detection techniques. To achieve this aim, we
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Figure 1: Cypider Overview
choose features that are broad enough to cover most of the static charac-
teristics of an Android app. The more extensive the features are, the more
resilient they are. To this end, we extract from the APK file, its static
contents such as dex, resources, assembly, etc., as explained in Section 4.
Cypider uses the extracted features from each content to computes a fixed-
length feature vector for each content features. Cypider leverages a machine
learning pre-processing technique, named feature hashing [10] to normalize
and reduce the size of the feature vectors, as described in Section 5. Based
on the extracted features of the previous stage, Cypider generates multiple
small and fixed-size feature vectors. The number of the generated feature
vectors depends on the number of APK contents that are considered during
feature extraction, i.e., each content type corresponds to one feature vector.
Afterward, Cypider performs a dimensionality reduction technique, specif-
ically by applying Principle Component Analysis (PCA), to reduce the size
of the feature vector from V to compressed embedding CV . The feature vec-
tor size and its compression are hyperparameters, which are set to |V | = 216
and |CV | = 100 in all the experiments. To ensure the efficient comparison
between the apps, Cypider is empowered with a highly scalable similarity
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computation technique, based on FAISS 2, which computes the similarities
between apps, as described in Section 6.
Then, we compute the similarity between a pair of apps with respect to
content feature vectors, to decide if the two apps are connected or not in the
similarity network. The result of this similarity computation is an undirected
network (or similarity network), where the nodes are Android apps, and the
edges represent the high similarity between two apps for one content. For
highly similar apps, multiple edges are expected to be formed between two
apps. Besides, the more edges are formed, the more likely the apps malicious.
Cypider takes similarity network as input in order to detect communities
of malicious apps. However, this step mainly depends on the usage scenario
(Section 2.2). In the case of a malicious dataset, Cypider extracts communities
of highly connected apps and removes them out from the dataset. The rest of
the apps, i.e., apps that do not belong to any community, will be considered
in another Cypider malware detection iteration. We expect to get a pure
or near-pure community if its apps belong to the same or almost the same
Android malware family. In the case of a mixed dataset, Cypider first excludes
all the nodes with degree 1 from the similarity network, (i.e., the app is only
self-similar), which are most likely to be benign apps. Afterward, Cypider
extracts the communities of malicious apps.
The rest of the apps, which are not part of any community, will be pro-
cessed in future Cypider iterations. At this point, we expect to get some
communities of benign apps as false positives. However, Cypider’s decision is
explainable because, based on the similarity network, the security investiga-
tors can track for which contents the apps are similar. The previous option
could also be used to help in narrowing down the statistical features to pre-
vent benign apps from being considered in malicious communities. As for
community detection (Section 7), a highly scalable algorithm [11] is adopted
to improve Cypider’s community detection module. At this stage, we get a
set of malicious communities, which are most likely to be a malware fam-
ily or a subfamily. Cypider applies a one-class classifier [9] on the malicious
communities to produce a detection model, also called community finger-
print (Section 8). Instead of employing traditional crypto-hashing or fuzzy
hashing of one malware instance, this fingerprint represents the pattern of a
given detected community and captures the features of their apps. It is also
used to decide if new malware apps are part of a family or not. The result
2https://github.com/facebookresearch/faiss
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is multiple community fingerprints, each of which corresponds to a detected
community. The generated fingerprints are stored in the signature database,
to be used later in analyzing new malware.
At this stage, Cypider will execute another detection iteration using a new
dataset that also comprises the rest of the apps from the previous iteration,
which has not been assigned to any community. The same previous steps
will be followed in the new iteration. However, we need first to compare
the feature vectors of the new apps with the known malware communities
fingerprint that are stored in the database. The apps that are matched to a
community fingerprint are labeled as malicious without adding them to the
active dataset. The unmatched apps are added to the active dataset and are
considered in the next iteration of the detection process.
Cypider approach can be considered as an iterative process. In each iter-
ation, Cypider detects and extracts communities from the active dataset that
continuously gets new apps (malware only or mixed) daily, in addition to the
unassigned apps from the previous iterations.
4 Statistical Features
In this section, we present the statistical features that are extracted from
Android packaging (APK ) files, and which will be the input to the similarity
computation process. As mentioned earlier, the features need to be broad
enough to cover most of the static content of the APK file. The features could
be classified according to the following APK content categories: (1) Binary
features, which are derived from the byte-code (Dex file) of the Dalvik virtual
machine. The Dex file and its hex dump file are also considered. (2) Assembly
features, which are computed from the assembly of classes.dex. (3) Manifest
features, which are extracted from the Manifest file. (4) APK features, which
represent the rest of APK file contents, such as resources and assets. In this
section, we present the statistical features, which are based on the N-gram
concept. For more clarification, we first present the structure of Android
packaging.
4.1 Android APK Format
Android Application Package (APK ) is the official format for Android pack-
aging, which is used to distribute and install Android apps. It is similar to
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EXE file in Windows and DEB/RPM file in Linux. More specifically, APK
is a ZIP file that includes the required components to run the app. APK is
structured into a set of directories, namely: lib, res, assets and files namely:
AndroidManifest.xml and classes.dex. The purpose of these items is
the following: i) AndroidManifest.xml includes the app meta-data, e.g.,
name, version, required permissions, and used libraries. ii) classes.dex in-
cludes the compiled classes of the Java code. iii) The lib directory includes
C/C++ native libraries [17]. iv) The resources directory includes the non-
source code files that are packaged into the APK file during compilation. It
mostly includes media files such as audio, image, and video files.
4.2 N-grams
The N-gram is a technique found in Natural Language Processing (NLP),
and is defined as the sequence of N adjacent items that are extracted from a
larger sequence. In this work, we use N-gram to extract the sequences that
exist in Android malware to differentiate between the malware samples. We
apply the N-gram technique on different contents of Android app package,
such as classes.dex, which captures the semantic pattern of the APK. For
each APK content, we compute multiple feature vectors. Each vector V
∈ D (|D| = ΦN where Φ represents all the possible N-grams of a given
APK content). Each element from the vector V represents the number of
occurrences of a particular N-gram in APK content.
4.3 The classes.dex Bytes N-grams
To increase the amount of extracted information form classes.dex file, we
employ two types of N-gram: opcodes N-grams and bytes N-grams, which
are computed from Dex file and its assembly respectively. In addition, we
compute Byted N-grams from the hexdump of the classes.dex file, by sliding a
window of the hex string, where one field in that string is a byte, as depicted
in Figure 2.
4.4 Assembly opcodes N-grams
The opcode N-grams are the only sequences in the disassembly of classes.dex
file, where we can separate the instructions from their operands. Figure 2
shows an example of this N-gram. We choose opcodes instead of the complete
12
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Figure 2: Opcodes & Bytes From AnserverBot
instruction for many reasons: i) The opcodes are more resilient to simple
obfuscations that change some operands such as hard-coded IPs or URLs.
ii) The opcodes could be more robust to changes made by malware writers
who only modify or rename some operands when repackaging the Android
app. iii) Also, the extracted opcodes incur low computational cost compared
to the complete instruction.
The information obtained from the opcode N-gram could be more mean-
ingful by only considering functions that use sensitive APIs such as SMS API.
We can also decrease the noise from the N-gram information by excluding the
most common opcode sequence. The N-gram extraction process will result
in a list of unique N-grams along with their number of occurrence for each
content category, i.e., opcode instructions, classes.dex. Figure 2 depicts the
extracted N-grams from the instructions and the bytes of the first portion of
the AnserverBot malware. Besides, we consider the names of classes and
methods as assembly features.
4.5 Native Library N-grams
The Native Library identifies the C/C++ shared libraries [17] that are used
by malware. Native library is important in some cases to differentiate be-
tween two Android malware samples. For instance, in case of DroidKungFu
malware family, the malware is more likely to be DroidKungFu2 and
not DroidKungFu1, as DroidKungFu2 uses C/C++ library and Droid-
KungFu1 only uses Java byte code.
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4.6 APK N-grams
The N-gram of the APK file allows us to get an overview of the APK file
semantics. For instance, most of the repackaged apps are built by making
minor modifications to original apps [18]. Therefore, by applying N-gram
computation on the APK file, we can detect a high similarity between the
original app and the repackaged one. Besides, adversaries preserve some com-
ponents in the APK file, e.g., images and GUI layout structures, primarily
if they aim to build a phishing malware. In this case, both apps are visually
similar, and consequently, their N-gram sequences are similar with respect
to the resource directory.
4.7 Manifest File Features
AndroidManifest.xml file, which contains the permissions that are requested
by apps provides important features that could help in detecting malicious
apps. For example, apps that request SMS send permission are more sus-
picious, as an important percentage of Android malware apps sends SMS
to premium phone numbers. In addition, other features from AndroidMani-
fest.xml are extracted namely, services, activities, and receivers.
4.8 Android API Calls
The request permissions give a global view of the possible behavior of an
app. However, a more granular view could be obtained by tracking the
Android API calls, as single permission allows access to multiple API calls.
Therefore, we add the list of API calls list, which is used by the apps, to
the feature list. In addition, we focus more on the suspicious APIs, such
as sendTextMessage() and orphan APIs, which correspond to undeclared
permissions. We also extract the list of permissions that have no used APIs
in the app.
4.9 Resources
In this category, we extract features that are related to the APK resources,
such as text string, file names, and their content. We mainly extract the files
that do not include the names of standard files, e.g., String.xml. Also, we
consider the contents of files by computing md4 hashes on each resource file,
14
# Content Type Features Implemented Feature
0 APK Byte N-grams X
1 Classes.dex Byte N-grams X
2 Native Library Bytes N-grams X
3 Assembly Opcodes Ngrams X
4 Assembly Class Names
5 Assembly Method Names
6 Android API X
7 Orphan Android API
8 Manifest Permissions X
9 Manifest Activities X
10 Manifest Services X
11 Manifest Receivers
12 IPs and URLs X
13 APK Files names X
14 APK File light hashes (md4)
15 Text Strings
Table 1: Content feature categories
as it incurs low computation cost compared to more modern cryptographic
hashing algorithms such as MD5 and SHA1. Therefore, the scalability of
the system is enhanced. Finally, we apply text string selection on the text
resources by leveraging tf-idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency)
[19] technique for this purpose.
4.10 APK Content Types
Table 1 summarizes the categories of the proposed features based on APK
contents of the app. It also shows the features that are considered in the
current implementation of Cypider. We believe that the used features give a
more accurate representation of Android packages as shown in previous work
[20]. In the other hands, The features that we excluded such as Text Strings
and Assembly Class Names are highly vulnerable to common obfuscation
techniques. Also, excluded features such as Manifest Receivers generate very
sparse features vectors which effect the overall accuracy.
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5 Feature Preprocessing
The proposed framework is based mainly on two atomic operations, which
are Feature extraction and similarity computation. Hence, it is of paramount
importance to optimize both their design and implementation to achieve the
intended scalability. The feature processing operation is expected to output a
feature vector, which can be used to compute the similarity between apps in
a straightforward manner. The produced vectors will be used as input to the
Cypider community detection system. One of the drawbacks of the N-gram
technique (Section 4.2) is its very high dimensionality D. The computation
and the memory needed by Cypider for Android malware detection depend
dramatically on the dimension number D. Moreover, the complexity of com-
puting the extracted N-grams features increases exponentially with N . For
example, for the opcodes N-grams, described in Section 4.2, the dimension D
equals to R2 for bi-grams, where R = 200, the number of possible opcodes
in Dalvik VM. Similarly, for 3-grams, the dimension D = R3; for 4-grams,
D = R4. Furthermore, N has to be at least 3 or 5 to capture the semantics
of some Android APK content.
Algorithm 1: Feature Vector Computation
input : Content Features: Set,
L: Feature Vector Length
output: Feature Vector
vector = new vector[L];
for Item in Content Features do
H = hash(Item) ;
feature index = H mod L ;
vector[feature index] = vector[feature index] + 1 ;
end
To reduce the high dimensionality of an arbitrary vector, we leverage
the hashing trick technique [10], to output a fixed-size feature vector. More
formally, hashing trick reduces a vector V with D = RN to a compressed
version with D = RM , where M << N . The compressed vector allows
Cypider’s clustering system to handle a large volume of Android apps, which
boosts Cypider in terms of both computation and memory. As shown in
previous work, [21, 10], the hash kernel approximately preserves the vector
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distance. Moreover, the hashing technique used to reduce dimensionality
affects the computational cost, which linearly increases with the number of
samples and groups. Algorithm 1 illustrates the overall process of computing
the compacted feature vector from an N-grams set. Furthermore, it helps to
control the length of the compressed vector in an associated feature space.
Despite getting a fixed-length vector using the feature hashing technique,
the vector size is still significant (size=216) to leverage very fast approxi-
mate similarity computation [22]. To overcome this issue, one could suggest
decreasing the size of the feature hashing vector. However, due to hashing
collision, this will drastically reduce the quality of the produced vector [22],
which is not useful for malware fingerprinting [23]. Therefore, we resort to
dimensionality reduction techniques to compress the feature hashing vectors
while keeping the maximum of information. To this end, we aim to reduce the
size of the feature hashing vector V from 216 to only compressed embedding
CV of size S = 100.
To this point, we have a sizeable discrete vector obtained from one of the
previous setups, mainly using feature hashing. The aim is to decrease its
dimensionality by using dimensionality reduction techniques. To this end,
we choose the used PCA (principal component analysis) in the current im-
plementation of feature hashing due to its simplicity. We could also leverage
other techniques, and consider the comparison between them regarding in-
formation preservation as future work. We apply PCA to choose the top
S = 100 important PCA components which render our digest. We use PCA
on the matrix, where rows are the discrete vectors of the samples.
Compressing the feature hashing vector using dimensionality reduction
(PCA) will economize the space (≈ x650 times less memory and disk space)
and boost the similarity computation time (≈ x700 as will be presented in
the next sections). However, this raises two concerns, namely portability
and computation time. Regarding portability, the question is whether the
produced digest for a given sample is reusable. This means that we could
compute the digest using a matrix from dataset A from epoch Ti and use it
to calculate the similarity with another digest generated using a matrix from
dataset B from epoch Tj. Our experiments confirm the portability of our
digest across different datasets’ epochs.
As for the computation concern, we question the scalability of PCA (us-
ing SVD implementation) to large datasets since the asymptotic complexity
exceeds cubic in the best cases. To solve this issue, we compute the principal
components of PCA, using only a fraction of the dataset. Afterward, we
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employ those components to compress the feature hashing of the dataset. It
is essential to mention that the asymptotic complexity is constant for the
computation of the components in fixed-size sampled datasets (≈ 1k records
from the input dataset) because of the fixed size. Also, using the computed
principal components on the whole input dataset has linear growth with the
size of the input dataset; also, it is speedy (matrix multiplication). As such,
we employ this technique in all our operations. To this end, we have a set
of compressed digests for each content type, i.e., a digest for each malware
sample.
6 Similarity Computation
The backbone of Cypider is the similarity network, which is obtained by
computing the pair-wise similarity between each feature vector of the apps
APKs. Based on the number of these content vectors, we collect multiple
similarities, which gives flexibility and modularity to Cypider. Any new fea-
ture vector could be added to the similarity network without disturbing the
Cypider process. Moreover, the features could be smoothly removed, making
the process of selecting the best features more convenient. This is of crucial
importance to investigators. Having multiple similarities between apps static
contents in the similarity network allows them to make explainable decisions
since they can track contents leading to apps similarity in the final similarity
network.
It is important to conduct similarity computation in an efficient way that
is much faster than brute-force computation. To this end, in the original
Cypider design, we leverage Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) techniques,
in particular LSH Forest [24]. The latter is a tunable high-performance
algorithm used in similarity computation of Cypider. In LSH Forest, similar
items hashed using LSH are most likely to be in the same bucket (collide)
and dissimilar items in different ones. This property of LSH function could
be achieved using many similarity measures. In our case, this is achieved
using the well-known Euclidean distance.
d(m,n) = ‖Vm − Vn‖ =
√√√√√ |S|∑
|i=1|
(Vm(i)− Vn(i))2 (1)
As depicted in Formula 1, after extracting the content feature vectors m
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Figure 3: Sparse Vector Similarity Computation Time
and n of one APK content from a given pair of Android apps, we use the
Euclidean distance to compute the distance between the two feature vectors
m and n. Figure 3 depicts the LSH computational time with respect to the
number of apps using one CPU core and one thread for the permission feature
vector. It is worth noticing that the current performance using LSH Forest
is acceptable even for a large number of daily malware samples (reaching 40k
apps per hour). In the enhanced Cypider, these results are drastically im-
proved thanks to using compressed embedding (size=100) instead of feature
hashing vectors (size=216).
Furthermore, instead of LSH Forest, we could use fuzzy similarity tech-
niques, such as FAISS 3 implementation, which exploits all the CPU cores
in addition to multi-threading. Figure 4 presents the new similarity compu-
tation time (in seconds) after using the compressed embedding and FAISS
library. Cypider is ≈ x700 times faster compared to the previous setup on
commodity hardware (Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz). In
the previous setup, Cypider took ≈ 80 minutes to compute the similarity be-
tween 50k apps on the permission content vectors. In contrast, Cypider
takes only ≈ 8 seconds to compute the similarity in the current setup.
3https://github.com/facebookresearch/faiss
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Figure 4: Embedding Similarity Computation Time
Afterward, we build the similarity connections between the app feature
vectors if the pairwise similarity exceeds a certain threshold, named simi-
larity threshold. We propose a systematic mechanism to choose the sim-
ilarity threshold for different content vectors (opcodes, functions, and bi-
nary bytes), which have different search spaces. The process of choosing the
threshold is: (1) For a given vector content, we compute the similarity be-
tween all the dataset digests. (2) We calculate the average of the similarity
values for this content vector. (3) To this point, we use a percentage from
the computed average as the threshold. The threshold percentage is fixed
and applied to the different averages of content types. Therefore, exploring
and searching for a suitable threshold needs only to tune the value of the
threshold percentage to fulfill the security practitioner requirements toward
the trade-off between purity and coverage.
In summary, the similarity threshold is the percentage of the aver-
age similarity of a given content. In other words, we compute the average
value of all the pairwise similarities for each feature content. Then, we fix
a percentage from this average to be the final threshold. Finally, we use
the same percentage of similarity threshold for all the feature contents
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despite having different average values. The similarity threshold is man-
ually fixed based on our evaluation, and the same threshold is used in all
experiments. We investigate the effect of the similarity threshold on Cypi-
der performance in the evaluation section (Section 9). The final result of
the similarity computation is a heterogeneous network, where the nodes are
the apps, and the edges represent the similarity between apps if it exceeds a
certain threshold.
7 Community Detection
A scalable community detection algorithm is essential to extract suspicious
communities. As such, we resort to the Fast unfolding community detection
algorithm [11], which can scale to billions of network links. The algorithm
yields excellent results by measuring the modularity of communities. The
latter is a scalar value M ∈ [−1, 1] that measures the density of edges inside
a given community compared to the edges between communities. The algo-
rithm uses an approximation of the modularity since finding the exact value is
computationally hard [11]. The previous algorithm requires a homogeneous
network as input to work properly.
Accordingly, we leverage a majority-voting mechanism to homogenize the
heterogeneous network generated by the similarity computation. Given the
number of content similarity links s, the majority-voting method decides
whether a pair of apps are similar or not by computing the ratio s/S, where
S is the number of all contents used in the current Cypider configuration.
If the ratio is above the average, the apps will only have one link in the
similarity network. Otherwise, all the links will be removed.
It is important to mention that content similarity links could be kept
for later use, such as to conduct thorough investigations about given apps.
Investigators could use them, for example, to figure out how similar the apps
are, and in which content they are similar. The prior use case could be of
great importance to security analysts.
To prevent getting inaccurate suspicious communities, we propose to
leverage the majority-voting mechanism by filtering the links that exist be-
tween the nodes (apps). More precisely, we filter all links with a degree that is
less than a degree filtering parameter. This hyperparameter keeps only edges
of a given node whose number is above the threshold. We name this hyper-
parameter a content threshold and is defined as the minimum number of
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similar contents needed to keep a link in the final similarity network.
As mentioned above, only nodes with high connectivity maintain their
edges, which are supposedly like similar malicious apps. Notice that all the
parameters have been fixed in our evaluations. In a mixed dataset scenario,
we use the degree 1 to filter all apps having a similarity link to themselves
since they are not similar to any other app in the active dataset. Cypider
filters these apps and consider them as benign. Cypider also extracts a set
of communities with different sizes using the community detection algorithm
[11]. Afterward, Cypider filters all communities whose community cardinal
is less than the minimum community size parameter (fixed for all the eval-
uations). As previously mentioned, the purpose of filtration is to discard
inaccurate communities. This is illustrated in Figure 1 on a small Android
dataset (250 malware apps), where the process of the community detection
starts with a homogeneous network and ends up with suspicious communi-
ties. The content threshold and community size hyper parameters are
thoroughly investigated in the evaluation section (Section 9).
8 Community Fingerprint
In addition to detecting malicious communities, Cypider also aims at gen-
erating fingerprints from the extracted communities. This could be done
automatically since Cypider tends to be completely unsupervised. Therefore,
in the following iteration, Cypider filters the known apps without adding
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them to the active dataset. In particular, Cypider aims to generate a fuzzy
fingerprint, not only for one app but also for the whole malicious commu-
nity that represents malware family or subfamily. Unfortunately, traditional
cryptography fingerprints or fuzzy hashing techniques are not suitable for this
purpose. Therefore, we propose a novel fingerprinting technique based on the
One-Class Support Vector Machine learning model (OC-SVM) [9]. The lat-
ter could be fuzzy enough to be able to detect a set of malicious apps, in
particular, the soft boundary model, of a given community. Thanks to the
one-class model, Cypider can classify new apps as belonging to a community
or not.
It is also important to mention that the signature database generated
by Cypider is much more compressed compared to the traditional methods,
where the signature is only for one malicious app. Besides, the computation
of the signature is highly reduced since we check only with the community
fingerprints instead of checking with each single malware hash signature.
Cypider generates a community fingerprint from a set of malicious apps
as follows. First, Cypider extracts the features, as presented in Section 4.
Afterwards, it trains the one-class model using the statistical features of
the malicious community apps. In order to improve the accuracy of the
community fingerprint (model), Cypider applies feature selection techniques
, as described in the following sub-section.
A large number of Android APK features may potentially impact the
accuracy of the generated community fingerprint. To overcome this issue,
Cypider only uses the best N features with the highest information gains
and discards irrelevant ones to reduce the overhead of unnecessary compu-
tational complexity. The selection of these valuable features is based on two
metrics, namely variance threshold and inverse document frequency (IDF).
After computing the variance of the Android apps features, we use a fixed
threshold of T to filter the features with a variance that is lower than T .
Notice that a threshold T = 0 results in discarding all the features with the
same value for all Android apps, which makes sense because the information
gain from a fixed number for all the community apps is zero.
idf(t) = log
|F |
1 + |{fapk : t ∈ fapk}| (2)
Furthermore, we compute the inverse document frequency (IDF) on the
list F = {fapk1, ..., fapkN}, where fapk is the set of Android APK features and
|F | is the number of input APKs. The idf(t) is calculated using Formula 2,
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where |{fapk : t ∈ fapk}| is the number of Android APKs having a feature
value t. Notice that the number 1 in the formula is added to avoid zero-
division. The computed idf(t) is used as an alternative to frequencies, which
exhibit less effectiveness in similar solutions.
9 Experimental Results
In this section, we start with an overview of the implementation and testing
setup, including the dataset and the performance measurement techniques.
Afterward, we present the achieved results regarding the defined metrics for
both usage scenarios that are adopted in Cypider framework, namely malware
only and mixed datasets.
9.1 Implementation
Cypider is implemented using Python programming language and bash command-
line tools. The generation of binary N-grams is performed using xxd tool to
convert the content of the package to a sequence of bytes, in addition to a set
of command tools such as awk and grep to filter the results. To apply reverse
engineering on the Dex byte-code, we use dexdump, a tool that is provided
by Android SDK. We filter the generated assembly using the standard Unix
tools. To extract the permissions from AndroidManifest.xml, we use aapt, an
Android SDK tool, to convert the binary XML to a readable format. Then,
we parse the produced XML file using the standard Python XML parsing
library. The efficiency of Cypider is evaluated under a commodity hardware
server (Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630, 2.6GHz).
9.2 Dataset and Test Setup
In order to evaluate Cypider, three well-known Android datasets are used,
namely, (i) MalGenome malware dataset [25] [8], (ii) Drebin malware dataset
[13] [14, 26], and AndroZoo public Android app repository. As presented in
Table 2, two additional datasets are built based on the previous ones by
adding Android apps, which were randomly downloaded from Google Play
between late 2014 and beginning of 2015. In order to build Drebin Mixed
and AndroZoo Mixed datasets, 4, 403 benign apps are added to the original
Drebin dataset, which results is a mixed dataset (malware & benign) with
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Drebin Genome AndroZoo
Size 8733 4239 110k
Malware 4330 1168 66k
Benign 4403 3071 44k
Families 46 14 /
Table 2: Evaluation Datasets
50% of apps in each category. In the same way, Genome Mixed dataset is
built with 75% of benign apps (the mixed dataset will be publicly available
for the research community).
The three datasets mentioned above are used to evaluate Cypider in the
unsupervised usage evaluation scenarios and by considering two cases: with
and without benign apps, as shown in Section 2.2. First, Cypider is evaluated
against malware samples only. To this end, Drebin, AndroZoo, and Genome
datasets were used. This use case is the most attractive one in bulk malware
analysis since it decreases the cost and detection time of malware by con-
sidering only a sample from each detected community. Second, Cypider is
evaluated against mixed datasets. The second scenario is more challenging as
we might not only get the suspicious communities as output but also benign
communities (false positives) are expected along with filtered benign apps.
To asses Cypider obfuscation resiliency, we conduct the evaluation on
PRAGuard obfuscation dataset4, which contains 11k obfuscated malicious
apps, generated using common obfuscation techniques [15]. Besides, we gen-
erate 100k benign and malware obfuscated apps using the DroidChameleon
obfuscation tool [16], which employs common and combinations of obfusca-
tions techniques.
We define various metrics to measure Cypider performance under each
dataset. The used metrics are the following:
Apps Detection Metrics
A1: True Malware: It measures the number of malicious apps that are
detected by Cypider. It is applied to both usage evaluation scenarios.
A2: False Malware: It measures the number of benign apps that are falsely
detected as malware apps. It is applied only on the mixed dataset as
4http://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/AndroidPRAGuardDataset
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there are no benign apps in the other datasets.
A3: True Benign: It measures the number of filtered benign apps. It is
only applied on mixed datasets.
A4: False Benign: It measures the number of malware apps that are incor-
rectly considered as benign in the mixed dataset.
A5: Detection Coverage: It measures the percentage of detected malware
from the overall dataset, i.e., it represents the number of Android apps,
which are assigned to communities, divided by the total number of apps
in the input dataset.
Community Detection Metrics
C1: Detected Communities : It measures the number of suspicious commu-
nities that are extracted by Cypider.
C2: Pure Detected Communities : It measures the number of communities,
which only contain instances of the same Android malware family. To
check the purity of a given community, we refer to the labels of the used
datasets. This metric is applied in both usage evaluation scenarios.
C3: K-Mixed Communities : It measures the number of communities with
K-mixed malware families, where K is the number of families in a
detected community. This metric is applied in both usage evaluation
scenarios.
C4: Benign Communities : It measures the number of benign communities
that are falsely detected as suspicious. This metric is used in the mixed
dataset evaluation.
9.3 Mixed Dataset Results
The evaluation results of applying Cypider on Drebin Mixed and Genome
Mixed datasets are presented in Table 3. We can notice that Cypider suc-
ceeded in detecting half of the actual malware in one single iteration and
under both datasets, although the noise of benign apps is about 50%− 75%
of the actual dataset. Also, Cypider was able to filter out a large number of
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Community Metrics Drebin Mixed Genome Mixed
True Malware A1 2413 449
False Malware A2 190 103
True Benign A3 257 171
False Benign A4 38 10
Table 3: Evaluation Using Apps Metrics (Mixed)
benign apps from the dataset. However, in both datasets, we got a false mal-
ware of 190 and 103 apps under Drebin Mixed and Genome Mixed datasets
respectively. We also obtained a false benign of 38 and 10 apps under the
two above-mentioned datasets respectively. We can observe that the false
positives, and false negatives appear, in most cases, in communities of apps
with the same category (malware or benign). Therefore, it is possible to
carry out a straightforward investigation by analyzing some samples from a
given suspicious community. Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) show the similarity
network and the generated communities respectively.
Table 4 shows the evaluation results of Cypider in terms of community
metrics. The main result is that Cypider succeeds in extracting 179 (resp.,
61) pure detected communities out of 188 (resp., 61) in case of Mixed Drebin
(resp., Mixed Genome). As a consequence, almost all the detected communi-
ties are composed of instances from the same family, whether malware or be-
nign. Even the detected mixed communities are only composed of two labels
(2-mixed). It is worth mentioning that all the detected benign communities
are pure, i.e., there is no malware instance, which makes the investigation
easier for security analysts. Also, according to our analysis, most malware
labels in the 2-mixed malicious communities refer to the same malware but
with different names, which is due to the naming convention that is made by
each security vendor. For example, in one of the 2-mixed communities, we
found instances of two types of malware: FakeInstaller and Opfake. These
two names refer to the same malware family [27], which is FakeInstaller.
Also, we found that FakeInstaller and TrojanSMS.Boxer.AQ refer to the
same malware [28], although they have different vendor names.
9.4 Results of Malware-only Datasets
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of Cypider in terms of the app metrics and
community metrics, and under malware only datasets. As the mixed dataset
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Apps Metrics Drebin Mixed Genome Mixed
Detected C1 188 61
Pure Detected C2 179 61
2-Mixed C3 9 0
Benign C4 18 16
Table 4: Evaluation Using Community Metrics
Community Metrics Drebin Genome
True Malware A1 2223 449
Table 5: Evaluation Using Apps Metrics (Malware)
is used, i.e., by only filtering out the benign apps, we achieved almost sim-
ilar results. Cypider succeeds in detecting about 50% of all malware in one
iteration. Besides, nearly all the obtained communities are pure. This result
shows that Cypider can provide the security analyst with the necessary tool
that can analyze the maliciousness of a given suspicious community by only
matching one or two samples. Moreover, the analysis process complexity is
significantly reduced from 2413 detected malware to only 188 found commu-
nities. Based on this result, we believe that the analysis window could be
reduced, and it is possible to overcome the overwhelming number of detected
Android malware daily. We can also observe that nine 2-mixed communities
are extracted from the Drebin dataset, which contain malware with different
names but refer to the same family, as obtained previously. The similarity
network of the Drebin malware dataset is shown in Figure 6(a). After ex-
ecuting the community detection algorithm, a set of malicious communities
are identified, as depicted in Figure 6(b).
Apps Metrics Drebin Genome
Detected C1 170 45
Pure Detected C2 161 45
2-Mixed C3 9 0
Table 6: Evaluation Using Community Metrics
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(a) Simialrity Network
(b) Detected Communities
Figure 6: Cypider Network of Drebin Malware Dataset
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Figure 7: Cypider Network of Drebin Malware Dataset
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Family Community Size Family Detection (Acc) Malware (Acc) Benign (Acc) General (F1)
HiddenAds 1774 77.43 93.40 94.93 87.83
BridgeMaster 1041 76.99 93.08 93.22 87.05
InfoStealer 2973 86.60 88.37 91.26 75.50
Plankton 495 77.76 100.0 100.0 75.10
BaseBrigge 1499 76.76 88.51 92.47 73.28
Utchi 973 76.19 99.98 100.0 72.02
Table 7: Community Fingerprint Accuracy on Different Families
9.5 Community Fingerprint Results
Table 7 shows the evaluation results for the community fingerprint, which
is applied to different detected communities with various Android malware
families. The community fingerprint model (One-Class SVM) achieves 87%
f1-score in detecting malware from the same malware family that is used in
the training phase. In the signature database, these new malware samples
share the same family with a given community fingerprint. Furthermore,
the compressed format of this fingerprint, i.e., learning model in a binary
format, could fingerprint an entire Android family, which results in a far
more compacted signature database.
The performance of the community fingerprint mainly depends on the
number of malware in the detected community. A higher detection perfor-
mance is achieved when more malware instances exist in the community. To
achieve this aim, we plan to determine a threshold for the community cardi-
nal, which is required to compute the fingerprint and store it in the signature
database.
As shown in Table 7, one of the main characteristics that are provided
by the community fingerprint, is its ability to differentiate between general
malware apps and benign apps with high accuracy. The reason behind this
high accuracy is the high similarity between general malware and the trained
family. Notice that the one-class SVM model is trained on samples from only
one malware family. In other words, malicious apps tend to have similar
features, although they do not belong to the same malware family. Thus,
benign samples and general malware are highly dissimilar; hence, benign
samples cannot match the community fingerprint.
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10 Hyper-parameters Analyses
In this section, we analyze the effect of Cypider hyper-parameters on the
overall performance measured using Purity, Coverage, and Community
Numbers metrics. Specifically, we investigate the similarity threshold,
the content threshold, and the community size, as presented in Section
6 and Section 7.
10.1 Purity Analysis
In the purity analysis, we compute the overall percentage of clustered mal-
ware samples of the groups belonging to the same Android malware family.
A perfect purity metric means that each detected community (cluster) con-
tains samples from the same Android malware family. Figure 8 and 9 show
the effect of Cypider hyper-parameters on the purity of the detected malware
communities in the similarity network of Drebin and AndroZoo datasets re-
spectively. It is worth noting that the content threshold is the most affect-
ing hyper-parameter on the overall purity. A small content threshold results
in a lower purity percentage, as shown in the evaluation of both Drebin and
AndroZoo datasets. This finding is intuitive because the outcome of Cypider
grouping is more accurate when using more content types threshold in the
majority voting similarity computation.
On the other hand, the similarity threshold has a secondary effect com-
pared to the content threshold. This means that a tight distant threshold
outputs less false (malware family) samples in the detected communities. Fi-
nally, we notice a very minor effect of the community size on the overall
purity metric for both Drebin and AndroZoo evaluations, as shown in Figure
8 and Figure 9 respectively.
10.2 Coverage Analysis
In the coverage analysis, we assess the percentage of the detected malware
from the overall input dataset. A perfect coverage means that Cypider detects
the malware samples in the produced malware communities. Figure 10 and
Figure 11 depict the change in the coverage percentage with Cypider hyper-
parameters for Drebin and AndroZoo datasets respectively. We notice that
the content threshold is the most affecting hyper-parameter on the overall
coverage metric. This means that a high content threshold in the majority
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Figure 8: Detection Purity, Hyper-parameters Analysis Results of Drebin
Dataset
voting (Section 6) detects fewer malware samples in the produced malware
communities. Therefore, the coverage metric decreases drastically with a
high content threshold, as shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11.
The similarity threshold and the community size have a secondary
effect on the coverage metric. For the similarity threshold, a wide distance
threshold yields a higher detection rate, and therefore a high coverage metric.
For the community size threshold, a large community size threshold ignores
many small malware communities, which affects the detection coverage met-
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Figure 9: Detection Purity, Hyper-parameters Analysis Results of AndroZoo
Dataset
ric negatively.
10.3 Number of Communities Analysis
In this section, we analyze the total number of the detected communities
produced by Cypider. A perfect Cypider clustering yields a result in which
the number of communities is equal to the actual number of malware families
in the input dataset. Figure 12 and Figure 13 depict the effect of Cypider
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Figure 10: Detection Coverage, Hyper-parameters Analysis Results of Drebin
Dataset
hyper-parameters on the number of the detected communities on Drebin and
AndroZoo datasets respectively. It is important to mention that the commu-
nity size has a strong influence on the number of communities. A significant
community size threshold will filter many small malware communities, which
influences the number of detected communities.
For the content threshold, the majority voting with a small content
threshold causes many communities to merge. This is because the samples
have to be similar in only two content thresholds to maintain a similarity link
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Figure 11: Detection Coverage, Hyper-parameters Analysis Results of An-
droZoo Dataset
in the similarity network. On the other hand, the majority voting with a high
content threshold will detect fewer malware samples and, therefore, less over-
all malicious communities. Finally, we notice a minor effect of the similarity
threshold on the overall number of the detected communities, as depicted in
Figure 12 and Figure 13 for Drebin and AndroZoo datasets respectively.
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Figure 12: Detected Communities, Hyper-parameters Analysis Results of
Drebin Dataset
10.4 Efficiency
In this section, we investigate the overall efficiency of Cypider framework.
Specifically, we present the runtime in seconds on the core computation of
our framework: (i) the similarity computation to build the similarity
network, (ii) the community detection to partition the similarity network
into a set of malicious communities.
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Figure 13: Detected Communities, Hyper-parameters Analysis Results of
AndroZoo Dataset
Efficiency Metrics The following metrics aim to answer the following
questions: How much time is needed to build the similarity network? How
much time is required to extract malicious communities?
• Similarity Network Building Time: It is the amount of time needed
to build the malware similarity network using an approximate similar-
ity computation on the malware FH digests.
• Community Detection Time: It is the amount of time needed to
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Figure 14: Overall Runtime Under Different Datasets
detect and extract malicious communities from the malware similarity
network.
• Total Time: It is the sum of the times given by the previous metrics.
Similarity Computation Figure 14 depicts the similarity computation
time in seconds to build Cypider similarity network. We notice that Cypider
framework is very efficient in producing the similarity network because we
employ locality sensitive hashing techniques to speed up the pairwise similar-
ity computation between the feature hashing vectors. For example, Cypider
took only few seconds to compute the similarity between 111k samples fea-
ture hashing vectors.
Community Detection Figures 15 and 16 present the community de-
tection time in seconds on Drebin and AndroZoo datasets respectively. We
analyze the effect of similarity and content thresholds on the overall com-
munity detection time. In Figures 15 and 16, we notice that Cypider spends
more time by decreasing the content threshold and decreasing the similarity
threshold in Drebin and AndroZoo experiments. The previous thresholds
setup increases the density of Cypider similarity network, and therefore the
community detection processing takes more time in the partition process of
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the network. On the other hand, increasing the content threshold while de-
creasing the similarity threshold produces a very sparse similarity network.
The latter takes a negligible time in the partition process.
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Figure 15: Cypider Community Detection Time, Hyper-parameters Analysis
(Drebin Malware Scenario)
11 Case Study: Recall and Precision Settings
In this section, we evaluate Cypider framework under recall and precision
settings. We aim to assess Cypider performance in terms of purity and cov-
erage in case the security practitioner focuses on having: (i) maximum recall
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Figure 16: Cypider Community Detection Time, Hyper-parameters Analysis
(Zoo Malware Scenario)
(a minimum false detection), or (ii) maximum precision (maximum cover-
age). Both recall and precision settings are common in real deployments.
We achieved the recall and precision settings by adjusting Cypider hyper-
parameters to reach the set goal. Figure 17 presents Cypider malware only
performance on different datasets (MalGenome, Drebin, AndroZoo) under re-
call and precision settings. In the recall setting, Cypider achieved 95%−100%
purity while maintaining 15%−26% malware coverage. Therefore, we detect
about 20% (on average) of the input malware in the form of communities with
98% purity (Figure 17, recall charts). On the other hand, Cypider achieved
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63%− 73% malware coverage while maintaining 84%− 93% purity, as shown
in Figure 17 (precision charts).
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Figure 17: Cypider Performance under Recall/Precision Settings On Mal-
ware Scenario
The contrast between the recall and precision settings is more clear visu-
ally in the similarity network, as shown in Figures 18 and 19 for MalGenome
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and Drebin datasets respectively. Figure 18 and Figure 19 present each mal-
ware family in a different color. Malware communities depicted with more
than one color contain more than one malware family. Pure malware commu-
nities have only one color in the edges and nodes. We notice more detected
malware communities in the similarity network in the precision settings. In
contrast, in the recall similarity network, we notice fewer malware commu-
nities, and most of the nodes are part of any not-detected community.
Figure 20 depicts Cypider mixed performance under recall and precision
settings for MalGenome, Drebin and AndroZoo datasets. The most notice-
able result is that all the detected benign communities have perfect purity
metrics under both recall and precision settings. Moreover, benign coverage
is less than the malware coverage under all settings. In other words, Cypi-
der could result in benign samples in the clustering but gathered in pure
communities, which is very helpful in case of manual investigations.
The difference between recall and precision settings in the mixed scenario
is more clear visually in the similarity networks. Figures 21 and 22 show the
recall and precision similarity network of MalGenome and Drebin datasets
respectively. Darker color communities contain malware samples, and lighter
ones contain benign samples. We notice a clear separation between the mali-
cious communities and the benign ones. Also, more and bigger communities
have been detected under the precision setting compared to the recall set-
ting. Tables 8 and 9 detail Cypider performance under the recall and the
precision settings in terms of coverage/purity and number of detected/pure
communities respectively.
Evaluation Setup Dataset Size Coverage/Purity %
Dataset Scenario Settings #Benign #Malware #Total
Malgenome
Malware
Recall / 1.23k 1.23k / 15.56%/99.0% 15.56%/99.0%
Precision / 1.23k 1.23k / 66.21%/91.0% 66.21%/91.0%
Mixed
Recall 4.03k 1.23k 5.26k 3.7%/100.0% 15.48%/99.0% 6.46%/100.0%
Precision 4.03k 1.23k 5.26k 39.66%/100.0% 61.02%/92.0% 44.68%/98.0%
Drebin
Malware
Recall / 5.55k 5.55k / 26.69%/93.0% 26.69%/93.0%
Precision / 5.55k 5.55k / 73.08%/84.0% 73.08%/84.0%
Mixed
Recall 7.64k 5.55k 13.19k 3.85%/100.0% 29.77%/88.0% 14.74%/90.0%
Precision 7.64k 5.55k 13.19k 44.27%/100.0% 72.0%/83.0% 55.93%/91.0%
AndroZoo
Malware
Recall / 66.76k 66.76k 0.0%/0.0% 18.48%/100.0% 18.48%/100.0%
Precision / 66.76k 66.76k 0.0%/0.0% 63.03%/92.0% 63.03%/92.0%
Mixed
Recall 44.18k 66.76k 110.94k 5.52%/100.0% 18.7%/100.0% 13.45%/100.0%
Precision 44.18k 66.76k 110.94k 47.63%/100.0% 63.19%/91.0% 56.99%/94.0%
Table 8: Coverage and Purity Results of The Community Detection Frame-
work Under Recall/Precision Settings
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Evaluation Setup Dataset Size #Communities/#Pure
Dataset Scenario Settings #Benign #Malware #Total Bengin Malware Overall
Malgenome
Malware
Recall / 1.23k 1.23k / 15/15 15/15
Precision / 1.23k 1.23k / 35/31 35/31
Mixed
Recall 4.03k 1.23k 5.26k 18/18 17/17 35/35
Precision 4.03k 1.23k 5.26k 71/71 34/31 105/102
Drebin
Malware
Recall / 5.55k 5.55k / 95/89 95/89
Precision / 5.55k 5.55k / 155/136 155/136
Mixed
Recall 7.64k 5.55k 13.19k 30/30 109/102 139/132
Precision 7.64k 5.55k 13.19k 125/125 152/132 277/257
AndroZoo
Malware
Recall / 66.76k 66.76k / 800/798 800/798
Precision / 66.76k 66.76k / 1355/1291 1355/1291
Mixed
Recall 44.18k 66.76k 110.94k 176/176 828/826 1004/1002
Precision 44.18k 66.76k 110.94k 586/586 1321/1250 1907/1836
Table 9: Number of Detected/Pure Communities of The Community Detec-
tion Framework Under Recall/Precision Settings
12 Case Study: Obfuscation Resiliency Anal-
yses
In this section, we investigate the robustness of Cypider framework against
common obfuscation techniques and code transformation in general. We em-
ploy PRAGuard obfuscated Android malware, which contains 11k samples,
along with benign samples from AndroZoo dataset. Table 10 details Cypider
performance on the malware and the mixed scenarios. We compare Cypider
performance before and after applying one or a combination of obfuscation
techniques, as shown in Table 10.
Evaluation Setup Coverage/Purity % #Communities/#Pure
Scenario Obfuscation Bengin Malware Overall Bengin Malware Overall
Malware
Malgenome (Orignal) / 66.2%/92.3% 66.2%/92.3% / 35/31 17/17
(1) TRIVIAL / 60.3%/99.8% 60.3%/99.8% / 34/34 35/31
(2) STRING ENCRYPTION / 63.5%/96.7% 63.5%/96.7% / 34/32 35/31
(3) REFLECTION / 70.8%/71.9% 70.8%/71.9% / 30/27 35/31
(4) CLASS ENCRYPTION / 38.3%/98.5% 38.3%/98.5% / 27/26 35/31
(1) + (2) / 52.4%/99.8% 52.4%/99.8% / 42/42 35/31
(1) + (2) + (3) / 65.1%/67.5% 65.1%/67.5% / 38/34 35/31
(1) + (2) + (3) + (4) / 36.3%/99.7% 36.3%/99.7% / 39/39 35/31
Mixed
Malgenome (Orignal) 52.84%/100.0% 45.44%/95.0% 51.1%/99.0% 63/63 36/32 99/95
(1) TRIVIAL 50.98%/100.0% 65.72%/90.0% 54.3%/97.0% 66/66 38/32 104/98
(2) STRING ENCRYPTION 52.47%/100.0% 68.41%/93.0% 56.06%/98.0% 66/66 33/30 99/96
(3) REFLECTION 51.45%/100.0% 77.23%/63.0% 57.21%/89.0% 65/65 29/21 94/86
(4) CLASS ENCRYPTION 52.84%/100.0% 45.44%/95.0% 51.10%/99.0% 63/63 36/32 99/95
(1) + (2) 52.47%/100.0% 68.41%/93.0% 56.06%/98.0% 66/66 33/30 99/96
(1) + (2) + (3) 53.66%/100.0% 67.91%/91.0% 57.01%/97.0% 64/64 34/29 98/93
(1) + (2) + (3) + (4) 49.04%/100.0% 44.64%/94.0% 48.01%/99.0% 66/66 39/37 105/103
Table 10: Obfuscation Evaluation Using PRAGuard Dataset
The evaluation results show that common obfuscation techniques have a
limited effect on Cypider performance in general (60% − 77% coverage and
71%−99% purity). Class encryption obfuscation decreased the coverage from
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66% in the non-obfuscated dataset to 36% − 38%. However, Class encryp-
tion did not affect the purity performance. Similarly, Reflection obfuscation
technique dropped down the purity to 67% − 71% compared to the origi-
nal dataset but did not affect the coverage performance. To strengthen our
findings (Table 10) on PRAGuard obfuscation dataset, we build our obfusca-
tion dataset using Droid Chameleon obfuscation tool. We obfuscated Drebin
malware dataset (5k malware samples) and benign samples from AndroZoo
dataset (5k malware samples). The result is 100k samples (50k malware
and 50k benign) from different obfuscation settings, as shown in Table 11.
Similar to PRAGuard experiment, we compare Cypider performance before
obfuscation (original Drebin dataset) and after obfuscation. However, this
experiment is different from the PRAGuard one because both benign and
malicious samples are obfuscated.
Evaluation Setup Coverage/Purity % #Communities/#Pure
Scenario Obfuscation Bengin Malware Overall Bengin Malware Overall
Mixed
Drebin (Original) 44.27%/100.0% 72.0%/83.0% 55.93%/91.0% 125/125 152/132 277/257
Class Renaming 41.71%/100.0% 72.61%/83.0% 54.64%/91.0% 129/129 156/135 285/264
Method Renaming 42.02%/100.0% 71.08%/83.0% 54.19%/91.0% 121/121 149/129 270/250
Field Renaming 43.59%/100.0% 72.01%/83.0% 55.49%/91.0% 128/128 148/127 276/255
Code Reordering 43.43%/100.0% 71.49%/83.0% 55.19%/91.0% 127/127 155/135 282/262
Debug Information Removing 44.34%/100.0% 72.09%/83.0% 55.96%/91.0% 117/117 151/130 268/247
Junk Code Insertion 40.71%/100.0% 71.81%/83.0% 53.73%/90.0% 124/124 153/132 277/256
Instruction Insertion 42.65%/100.0% 71.25%/83.0% 54.63%/91.0% 120/120 156/136 276/256
String Encryption 43.2%/100.0% 72.16%/83.0% 55.32%/91.0% 133/133 147/127 280/260
Array Encryption 43.55%/100.0% 71.93%/83.0% 55.42%/91.0% 125/125 152/131 277/256
Malware
Drebin (Original) / 73.08%/84.0% 73.08%/84.0% / 155/136 155/136
Class Renaming / 74.14%/84.0% 74.14%/84.0% / 160/137 160/137
Method Renaming / 72.66%/83.0% 72.66%/83.0% / 159/136 159/136
Field Renaming / 73.75%/83.0% 73.75%/83.0% / 155/132 155/132
Code Reordering / 74.07%/83.0% 74.07%/83.0% / 158/135 158/135
Debug Information Removing / 72.92%/83.0% 72.92%/83.0% / 155/132 155/132
Junk Code Insertion / 73.86%/83.0% 73.86%/83.0% / 157/135 157/135
Instruction Insertion / 73.96%/85.0% 73.96%/85.0% / 160/137 160/137
String Encryption / 73.8%/83.0% 73.8%/83.0% / 155/132 155/132
Array Encryption / 73.8%/83.0% 73.8%/83.0% / 155/133 155/133
Table 11: Obfuscation Evaluation Using DroidChameleon Tool on Drebin
Dataset
Table 11 details the result of Cypider framework on the different obfusca-
tion techniques. The most noticeable result is that the obfuscation techniques
provided by the DroidChameleon tool have a limited effect on our cluster-
ing framework. All the performance metrics were kept stable on both non
obfuscated and obfuscated samples under the malware and mixed scenar-
ios. We argue that Cypider framework is robust to common obfuscation and
code transformation techniques because our framework considers many APK
contents for feature extraction. Therefore, the obfuscation techniques could
affect one APK content, but Cypider could leverage other contents to finger-
print the malware sample and compute the similarity with other malware
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samples.
13 Discussion
Cypider framework achieves a very good result regarding the percentage of
the detected malware and purity of the communities considering the diffi-
culty of the task of malware clustering in general. However, we believe that
the detection performance of Cypider could be improved by considering more
content vectors. The more static coverage of the APK file is, the more broad
and accurate the suspicious communities are. Fortunately, Cypider could eas-
ily add new vectors due to the majority-voting mechanism to decide about
the similarity. Using only static features leads to the right results. How-
ever, including dynamic features in Cypider’s detection process could boost
detection since this covers Android malware that downloads and execute the
payload at runtime. Cypider with only static features could be a complemen-
tary solution to other detection approaches based on dynamic features. As
we have noticed in the evaluation results, there are more detected communi-
ties than the number of actual malware families. According to our analyses,
multiple communities could be part of the same malware family. However,
these communities could represent malware family variants. For example,
DroidKungFu family is considered as one family in Drebin dataset. How-
ever, there are many variants for this family in the Genome dataset such as
DroidKungFu1, DroidKungFu2 and DroidKungFu4. Moreover, we no-
tice that some malware instances could have various labels from the vendors.
For example, certain instances of FakeInst malware have their community
with no connection shared with the rest of the family. After a little investiga-
tion using the hashes of the instances, we identified a different label (Adwo),
which represents a different malware family. Moreover, the evaluation shows
the effectiveness of Cypider in identifying Zero-day malicious apps since the
detection was without any prior knowledge of the actual dataset. The un-
supervised feature of Cypider framework could make it handy for security
practitioners.
The concept of malicious community, proposed by Cypider, could be sim-
ilar to the malware family concept. However, there are some differences: i)
One malware family could be detected in multiple communities of malicious
apps. So, the community gives a more granular view of the malicious app
similarity based on given statical features. ii) Security practitioners could
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decide about a given malicious app family using manual analyses. How-
ever, the community concept comes from a purely unsupervised automatic
analysis. An important feature of Cypider that we can get from detected
suspicious communities is the explainability, which facilitates defining what
exactly is shared among the apps of a given community. The explainable
results are due to the multiple content similarity links between the apps. For
example, malware apps sharing the same IP addresses that are hard-coded
in the binary are most likely to be part of a Command and Control (C&C)
infrastructure and are the sign of a botnet.
Obfuscation is considered a big issue in malware detection systems, in-
cluding Cypider, where the adversary uses an obfuscated content or transfor-
mation attacks. The latter could download the malicious code and execute
it at runtime, is undetectable by Cypider unless the malware instances share
other covered contents. However, Cypider attempts to deal with obfuscated
apps by considering a range of techniques. i) Cypider leverages multiple
Android package contents (such as permissions), which allow the system to
be more robust against obfuscation since it also uses other un-obfuscated
contents. ii) In the case of Dex disassembly, Cypider uses instruction op-
code instead of the whole instruction to compute the N-grams. Therefore,
the latter would be more resilient to obfuscation in the instruction operands.
The previous techniques show their effectiveness in the evaluation since we
used a real malware dataset in addition to apps from Google play (where the
apps are supposedly obfuscated through ProGuard) and obfuscated malware
datasets (PRAGuard and DroidChameleon). Besides, Cypider framework
could be complementary to dynamic analysis solutions to achieve better re-
sults.
14 Related Work
Previous work on Android analysis can be classified with respect to the anal-
ysis task as follows:
• Malware detection The objective is to check if a unknown app is mali-
cious or not. They mostly apply supervised learning approaches. The
learning model is generated during a training phase and using labeled
samples. In the testing phase, the learning model aims to identify if
the analyzed sample is malware or benign.
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• Malware family attribution: Given a set of known families, the objective
of this task is to attribute an unknown sample to a known family.
• Similarity-based detection: The objective of this task is to find simi-
larities among different apps without knowing any information about
their types, i.e., benign or malware, or their families in case they are
malware.
14.1 Malware detection
The Android malware detection methods focus on identifying whether the
analyzed app is benign or malicious. They use three type of features: static,
dynamic, and hybrid. The static methods [14, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42] depend on static features, which are extracted from
the Apk file such as requested permissions, APIs, bytecodes, opcodes. The
dynamic methods [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53] use features that
are derived from the app’s execution. They are more resilient to obfuscations
than static analysis methods. However, they incur additional cost in terms of
processing and memory to run the app. The hybrid methods [26, 54, 55, 56,
57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64] use both static and dynamic features. In the case
of Win32 malware detection, some static analysis [65, 66], dynamic analysis
[67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 41, 72], and hybrid methods [73] have been proposed.
14.2 Malware family attribution
Malware family attribution methods [74, 18, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81] focus
on detecting variants of known families. In case of Win32 malware family
attribution, the methods are classified as static [82], dynamic [83], and hy-
brid [84]. Other methods combine between malware detection and family
attribution in case of Android OS [85, 86, 87, 88] and Win32 OS [89, 90]
14.3 Similarity-based detection
Similarity-based detection methods [91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96] focus on detecting
repackaged malware. They adopt the unsupervised learning approach, i,e,
they do not require training phase and they are directly applied on unlabeled
samples. They assume that two or multiple apps that share the same code
are likely to belong to the same family. Thus, they check if the apps are
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using the same malicious code (i.e., detection of malware families), or they
are reusing the code of the same original app (i.e., code reuse detection).
Table 12 summarizes the similarity-based detection methods with respect to
(1) extracted feature, (2) similarity algorithm, (3) dataset size, (4) obtained
findings from applying the method on the dataset, and (5) efficiency in terms
of running time of the similarity algorithm.
DroidMOSS [93] aims to detect repackaged apps from the Android Mar-
ket, which are redistributed to third-party marketplaces. It first applies a
fuzzy hashing technique on the opcode of each app collected from the mar-
kets to generate the fingerprint of that app. Then, it measures the similarity
between each app in the third-market and all the apps in the official Android
market using the Edit distance.
Zhou et al. [95] proposed PiggyApp to detect piggybacked apps, which
share the same primary module as the original app. It builds for each pri-
mary module its program dependency graph (PDG), and generates its se-
mantic feature vector. To detect similar vectors, it uses a linearithmic search
algorithm, which incurs time complexity of O(n log n), where n is the num-
ber of apps. AnDarwin [96, 97] uses program dependency graph to extract a
semantic vectors from each app. AnDarwin finds similar code segments that
are among all the semantic vectors of apps using Locality Sensitive Hashing
(LSH).
DNADroid [94] computes the similarity between two apps by comparing
their program dependency graphs. It then applies subgraph isomorphism
to find a mapping between nodes of two PDGs. MassVet [91] is designed
for vetting apps at a massive scale, without knowing what malware looks
like and how it behaves. It compares a submitted app with all apps already
on the market by focusing on the difference between those sharing a similar
GUI structure, which is known to be largely preserved during repackaging.
Similarly, DroidEagle [92] uses the layout resources within an app to detect
repackaged apps and phishing malware apps which are visually similar to the
original app. It generates a layout tree from each app, and uses the Layout
Edit Distance (LED) to measure the similarity among apps.
Cypider aims to identify community of malware, which represent malware
that are similar with respect to any set of features, which is different from
the family concept that groups similar samples according to a predefined set
of features. The fundamental idea of Cypider relies on building a similarity
network between the input apps. The app is represented as a vector of con-
tents. If one content is shared between a pair of apps, an edge is established
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between the two apps. The result is a similarity network, where the nodes
are Android apps and the edges represent the high similarity with respect to
one content between the apps.
Method Feature Similarity algorithm Dataset size Findings Efficiency
DroidMOSS [93] Opcode Edit distance N/A 5% to 13% repackaged apps O(n2)
PiggyApp [95] PDG linearithmic search algorithm N/A 0.97% to 2.7% repackaged apps O(n logn)
Andarwin [96, 97] PDG LSH 265359 4295 cloned and 36106 rebranded
DNADroid [94] PDG Subgraph isomorphism 75,000 141 cloned apps
MassVet [91] GUI DiffCom 1.2 million 127429 malicious 10 sec/app
DroidEagle [92] GUI LED 99626 1298 3 hours
Cypider APK features similarity network 110k 60− 80% coverage about 60 sec
85− 99% precision in the
detected malicious communities
Table 12: Comparison of similarity-based detection methods
15 Conclusion
In this paper, we design and implement a novel, efficient, and scalable frame-
work for Android malware detection, namely, Cypider. The detection mech-
anism relies on the community concept. Cypider consists of a systematic
framework that can generate a fingerprint for each community and identify
known and unknown malicious communities. Cypider has been implemented
and evaluated on different malicious and mixed datasets. Our findings show
that Cypider is a valuable and promising approach for detecting application
similarity and malicious communities in Android applications. Cypider needs
only few seconds to build a network similarity of a large number of apps, and
incurs about 60 seconds to perform community detection for 111k apps. The
results of the community fingerprint are auspicious as 87% of the detection
is achieved.
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(a) Recall Settings
(b) Precision Settings
Figure 18: Malgenome Malware Dataset, Similarity Network Under Re-
call/Precision Settings
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(a) Recall Settings
(b) Precision Settings
Figure 19: Drebin Malware Dataset, Similarity Network Under Re-
call/Precision Settings
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Figure 20: Cypider Performance under Recall/Precision Settings on Mixed
Scenario
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Figure 21: Malgenome Mixed Dataset, Similarity Network of Re-
call/Precision Settings
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Figure 22: Drebin Mixed Dataset Similarity, Network of Recall/Precision
Settings
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